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Abstract
To explore the relationship between spatial location and quality differentiation, we build a
dataset of over 30,000 restaurants rated by TripAdvisor, across large UK cities. Whereas
top-rated restaurants tend to locate closer to other top restaurants, bottom-rated restaurants
tend to locate away from each other and closer to top ones. Our theoretical model can
explain the main features of the observed spatial patterns. We find that an increase in the
population density in the city center reduces the spatial dispersion of both top and bottom
restaurants but the reduction is larger in magnitude for top restaurants. A larger quality
difference between top and bottom restaurants increases both the absolute and relative
dispersion of top restaurants.
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1 Introduction
The restaurant industry is a USD 800 billion industry in the United States. In fact, restaurants
have become so widespread that the National Restaurant Association reports that nearly 6 in
10 adults have worked in the restaurant industry at some point during their lives.1 The trend is
similar in other western countries. In the United Kingdom, eating out is so popular that revenue
from restaurants and other food services constitutes the largest proportion of the leisure sector
revenue.2 Busy modern life has transformed restaurants into something more than simply a place
to eat. Currently, to stay competitive, restaurants need to provide a unique dining experience
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and many of them now offer a wide range of food and beverages, from coffee and cocktails to
salads and healthy eating options. Taking care of their online reputation has become a necessity
for restaurant owners. Not only does a majority of consumers consult online reviews3 but more
than a third of diners will also not eat in a restaurant with less than a 4-star rating on online
review sites like TripAdvisor and Google.4 Among various new dimensions of differentiation,
location still plays an important role—according to the National Restaurant Association, 56% of
consumers would choose a restaurant within a walking distance over another.
The intrinsic importance of location and product differentiation makes the restaurant industry
a natural choice to study the relation between these two factors that affect competition. In
this study, we explore whether there are any systematic differences in how top- and bottom-
rated restaurants locate. In other words, we explore the spatial competition among quality-
differentiated firms, where quality is that perceived by consumers. To do this, we build a unique,
hand-collected dataset, which maps over 30,000 restaurants listed and rated on TripAdvisor’s
online review site, across cities in England and Wales. We find that top-rated restaurants
tend to be spatially more concentrated than bottom-rated ones and locate closer to the city
center. Whereas top-rated restaurants tend to locate closer to other top-rated restaurants, bottom-
rated ones tend to locate away from other bottom-rated restaurants and closer to top-rated
ones. Generally, as a group, bottom-rated restaurants tend to be less clustered than top-rated
restaurants.
The topic of the geographical concentration of companies or economic clusters has attracted
great attention both from a theoretical perspective (e.g., Krugman, 1991; Porter, 2000) and an
empirical research perspective (Duranton and Overman, 2005; Marcon and Puech, 2003, and
numerous others). Of particular interest is the question about which parameters determine the
formation of clusters. Gordon and McCann (2000), for instance, compare the advantages and
disadvantages of geographical proximity as perceived by business leaders in different sectors
and conclude that agglomeration advantages usually far outweigh the disadvantages of increased
competition. We contribute to this extensive literature with a novel study on the potential relation
between quality differentiation and spatial clustering of firms (restaurants) in cities.
The empirical literature on restaurants typically focuses on the impact of competition (e.g.,
an increase in the number of firms) on prices and on the relation between prices and quality.
For instance, De Silva et al. (2016) recently show that competition does not decrease but rather
increases restaurants’ prices. Due to agglomeration economies, restaurants benefit from positive
externalities in denser, well-served restaurant areas, which attract more consumers. They also
show a positive relationship between the prices charged by restaurants and their quality.
In cities, population density affects the variety of products available. Schiff (2015) shows
that a higher population density increases the diversity of cuisines and the range of restaurant
quality levels in cities. In high-density areas, consumption benefits are large because consumers
can visit more of the restaurants they prefer. Couture (2016) estimates the average household’s
3“Over three-quarters of UK consumers check online reviews, with TripAdvisor 2.5 times more influential than
Google,” Uberall press release, June 26, 2019, accessed January 25, 2020, https://uberall.com/en-gb/
company/press-releases/over-three-quarters-of-uk-consumers-check-online-re
views-with-tripadvisor-2-5-times-more-influential-than-google.
4“5 Industries Impacted by Online Reviews”, accessed January 25, 2020, https://onlinegeniuses.c
om/5-industries-impacted-by-online-reviews-infographic/.
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willingness to pay to move to a denser area. Both of these studies reemphasize the role of cities
as centers of consumption (see Glaeser et al., 2001).
Our analysis focuses neither on the relationship between quality and price nor on quality
competition. Rather, we contribute to the literature by exploring the relationship between quality
and spatial clustering as observed in the data. We also propose a competition model between
restaurants that can explain the main properties of the spatial patterns observed in our sample. We
build our model on models of imperfect competition among firms a` la Hotelling. Four restaurants
are competing in terms of prices and locations for consumers who are distributed along a line
segment. As in the standard Hotelling duopoly model, the subgame perfect equilibrium in price
and location is obtained by backward induction. Whereas the locations are chosen in the first
stage of the game, the prices are set in the second one.
In the literature, few theoretical results exist about multiple-firm Hotelling models. Brenner
(2005) analyzes a multi-firm Hotelling model under quadratic transport costs. He shows that in
the second stage of the game, a price equilibrium exists and is unique for any number of firms.
However, due to the analytical complexity related to the number of firms, Brenner relies on
numerical computations to determine the location equilibria for up to nine firms. The multi-firm
Hotelling model under linear transport costs was studied earlier by Economides (1993). In
contrast to the model with quadratic costs by Brenner (2005), the whole market is not served in
equilibrium.
In our model, unlike in the traditional Hotelling model, consumers also have idiosyncratic
tastes about restaurants. This means that they visit and buy from all restaurants with a positive
probability. The logit Hotelling model with multiple firms under linear transport costs was
studied by de Palma et al. (1985). They show that if consumer taste heterogeneity is high enough,
a single location equilibrium is obtained, in which all firms locate in the city center. In the case
of three firms, de Palma et al. (1987) show that lower heterogeneity levels lead firms to disperse
along the line segment and multiple location equilibria can emerge.
In our model, firms are differentiated by location but also by the quality of the good they
serve to consumers. In contrast to Hotelling models with strategic location and quality (see, e.g.,
Irmen and Thisse, 1998),5 we assume that the qualities of the goods are exogenous (i.e., related
to long-term decisions), whereas firms’ locations are endogenous (i.e., a short-term choice).
Tseng et al. (2010) examine a Hotelling duopoly model with exogenous quality. They show that
spatial dispersion (resp. concentration at the center) occurs if the difference in quality is small
enough (resp. large enough). However, our model is quite different from theirs as it involves
two firms of each quality type and, therefore, both inter- and intra-type competition is present.
Moreover, unlike in Tseng et al. (2010), consumer heterogeneity in our model results from
idiosyncratic tastes about restaurants rather than from the differences in consumers’ willingness
to pay for quality.
As in Brenner (2005), our multi-firm model admits a unique price equilibrium in the second
stage of the game. However, here, in addition to having multiple-firms as in the oligopoly
model by Brenner (2005) or the logit oligopoly model by de Palma et al. (1985), the quality
difference between top and bottom restaurants introduces additional complexity. Our model can
5Their model, in which firms compete in a multi-characteristic space, leads to maximum differentiation in one
dimension and minimum differentiation in all the others.
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only be solved using a numerical approach and we develop a numerical algorithm that utilizes a
state-of-the-art nonlinear solver to find symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, of which there
can be many. As in the triopoly model of de Palma et al. (1987), a lower level of consumer
taste heterogeneity fosters spatial dispersion and induces the emergence of multiple location
equilibria in the first stage of the game.
Our model differs from models in the literature that focus on the effect of competition (e.g.,
the number of competitors in the market or the level of transport costs) on price and quality
(see, e.g., Ma and Burgess, 1993). Here, we focus on explaining some properties of the spatial
patterns of top and bottom restaurants (e.g., their absolute and relative spatial dispersion) in
relation to their quality.
When consumer taste heterogeneity is relatively low, transport costs play a prominent role in
buying decisions. The city center attracts top restaurants, as it provides them the best access to
the customer base. Top restaurants are able to drive away bottom restaurants in the center through
quality competition. The latter then disperse around top restaurants, primarily serving customers
living outside the city center. However, when consumer taste heterogeneity is relatively high,
buying decisions appear rather random to restaurants. Consequently, the city center offers
relatively little advantage in terms of access to the customer base. As competition is fiercer
between top restaurants than bottom ones, top restaurants disperse more.
We also model non-uniform densities of consumers. For a two-firm model, Anderson et al.
(1997) have shown that tight density functions constitute an agglomeration force leading to
lower prices. Considering quality-differentiated firms, we show that the magnitude of the
quality difference between top and bottom restaurants qualifies this result. Although a larger
concentration of consumers in the center attracts both types of restaurants, a larger quality
difference increases the competition between top restaurants, forcing them to move apart. The
relative magnitude of these two effects determines which restaurant type locates closer to the
center.
We derive a number of testable predictions from our model about the spatial dispersion of
top and bottom restaurants and the effect of quality. In turn, we run regressions to test these
hypotheses and are able to validate most of them. We find that an increase in the population
density in the city center reduces the spatial dispersion of both top and bottom restaurants but
the reduction is larger in magnitude for top restaurants. A larger quality difference between top
and bottom restaurants increases both the absolute and relative dispersion of top restaurants.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the data and explore
the spatial patterns of restaurants across the cities. In Section 3, we present the model and
examine the relative spatial distribution of restaurants under different parameter configurations.
In Section 4, we empirically test our model’s predictions. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Spatial Analysis
2.1 Data
We built the dataset from four main sources.6
1. Data on restaurants and their quality
First, we chose a set of over 100 of the largest cities in the UK by population in 2017.7 We
then listed for each city all the restaurants ranked on ©TripAdvisor’s website from January 25
to February 14, 2018, using a restaurant search by city. We chose the restaurant rankings of
TripAdvisor, as it is by far the most widely used review site for restaurants.8 Restaurants are
ranked according to the TripAdvisor Popularity Index, which is calculated by a proprietary
algorithm and is usually updated weekly. The index considers quantity, quality, and recency
of reviews to determine reviewers’ overall satisfaction with a restaurant. An online tracking
system, as well as a “dedicated team of investigators,” is employed by TripAdvisor to prevent
and remove fake reviews.
TripAdvisor’s list of restaurants by city often includes restaurants located in nearby cities and
towns. Moreover, some restaurants have no ranking and/or addresses. These observations
were dropped from the sample.
2. City boundaries
City boundaries in the form of geometric polygons with GPS coordinates were obtained from
©OpenStreetMap9 and MapIt.10 The maps did not always clearly distinguish between the city
and its suburbs. We analyzed only cities that were clearly demarcated and matched closely
TripAdvisor’s definition of them.
3. GPS locations of restaurants
Restaurants’ mailing addresses, obtained from TripAdvisor, were converted to GPS coor-
dinates via APIs provided by Google Maps™ and Bing Maps™. After geocoding, a few
restaurants could not be located within relevant city boundaries. When addresses resulted in
invalid GPS coordinates (e.g., towns in other countries), observations were dropped from the
sample. We also excluded London as it is an outlier in terms of both the area and the number
of restaurants.
6All data were obtained and used in accordance with The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Research,
Education, Libraries and Archives) Regulations 2014, UK.
72017 World Population Review, “Population of Cities in United Kingdom (2017),” accessed January 25, 2018,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/united-kingdom-population/citi
es.
8A TripAdvisor-sponsored survey among its 9,500 registered consumers in the US and EU in 2018 claims that
it is by far the most widely used and trustworthy restaurant review website. In the UK, 87% of all respondents
agreed that online reviews influence their dining decisions. Moreover, 64% of respondents said they prefer to
use TripAdvisor (Google 22%, Facebook 8%) while at home and 70% while traveling (Google 21%, Facebook
5%); 93% of UK respondents agreed that TripAdvisor’s reviews matched their dining experiences (TripAdvisor,
“Influences on Diner Decision-Making,” accessed November 20, 2018, https://www.tripadvisor.com/
ForRestaurants/r3227).
9Data is available under the Open Database Licence, http://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright.
10MapIt contains Ordnance Survey data ©Crown copyright and database rights 2010-17, which is licensed
under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
mean sd min max
# top 82.44 70.23 18 374
# bottom 82.74 70.22 19 375
area (km2) 207.91 340.75 10.64 2224.19
population (in 1000) 215.84 151.72 26.80 1073.05
Observations 96
4. Population data
The UK does not have a central population registry. Unlike England and Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland collect separate population data. For consistency, we decided to restrict our
sample to the cities in the England and Wales as most of the largest UK cities are located
in those two countries. Our population data are sourced from the 2011 Census for England
and Wales.11 England and Wales are divided into 181,408 geographical units called Output
Areas (OAs), the lowest geographical level for which census estimates are available. The
average number of residents living in an OA was 309 in 2011. We allocated OAs to cities in
the sample by using their population-weighted centroids with GPS coordinates.
Our final sample for our empirical analysis consists of 31,715 restaurants across 96 large
cities in England and Wales (for the list of cities, see Appendix A).
2.2 Spatial Analysis
This analysis aims to explore the location differences between “good” and “bad” restaurants. To
this end, we rank restaurants in each of the 96 cities in the sample from best to worst using the
TripAdvisor Popularity Index. Next, all restaurants below the 25th percentile (the 1st quartile) of
the ranking are labeled Top and all restaurants at or above the 75th percentile (the 4th quartile)
are labeled Bottom.12 Table 1 provides basic summary statistics of our dataset.
In the following, we investigate several differences in the location of top and bottom
restaurants such as i) spatial dispersion, ii) spatial centricity, and iii) spatial dependence.
2.2.1 Spatial dispersion
We first examine whether top (T ) and bottom (B) restaurants disperse differently across the
city. To this end, we calculate the average distance of restaurants in each group from that
group’s geometric centroid (respectively dTi and d
B
i ) for each city i, i ∈ [1, 96]. All distances are
11The Office for National Statistics licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
12Our results are robust to restaurant classifications based on different percentiles. Although the results would
be more significant with a larger difference between the bottom and upper percentiles, the number of restaurants
in some smaller cities could be too low. As the percentiles approach the median, the difference between the two
groups decreases.
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calculated as great-circle distances.13 Figure 1 shows the location of top and bottom restaurants
in two sample cities—Newcastle and Liverpool. In both cities, bottom restaurants are more
dispersed than top ones.14
We use the ratio rdi = d
B
i /d
T
i as a measure of relative dispersion of top versus bottom
restaurants in city i. See Figure 2a for this measure of relative dispersion for all cities ranked
by total area from the smallest to the largest. The correlation between the average distances of
restaurants from their group’s geometric centroid and the city area is positive and significant,
although modest, for both top (r = 0.239, p = 0.019) and bottom (r = 0.391, p = 0.000)
restaurants. However, the relative dispersion between top and bottom restaurants does not vary
with city size (r = 0.008, p = 0.936)—the points in Figure 2a are uniformly scattered along the
horizontal axis. In most cities, bottom restaurants seem relatively more dispersed: 64% of all
points lie above the horizontal line rdi = 1.
We formally test the null hypothesis of no difference in the spatial dispersions between the
two groups of restaurants by using Anderson’s (2006) distance-based multivariate generalization
of Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances.15 In Figure 2a, the filled circles indicate the cities
for which the dispersion difference between the two groups is significant at the .05 level. The
dispersion difference is significant in 41 out of the 96 cities. In all but 5 significant cities, bottom
restaurants are relatively more dispersed than top ones.
2.2.2 Spatial centricity
While the above test reveals that bottom restaurants tend to be more dispersed than top ones, it
does not tell us whether they potentially locate in different places, in particular, whether one
group is more concentrated in the city center than the other. For this, we first need to define
the city center. The literature documents many proxies that serve this purpose (e.g., a city map
center point, main railway or bus station, main post office), of which none has a clear advantage.
For our research, we define the city center as the geographic centroid (center of gravity) of
all restaurants in the city, which can be intuitively interpreted as the city’s dining center. As
restaurants tend to concentrate in places where people spend time together, our center should
indicate where the average individual shows up when going out for dinner.
For each group of restaurants, we calculate the average distance of restaurants to the city
center (respectively cTi and c
B
i ) and then use the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon two-sided test to
decide if the difference between groups is significant. Figure 2b shows the relative average
distances (cBi /c
T
i ) of top and bottom restaurants across all cities ranked by area. The filled
circles indicate cities for which the test is significant at the .05 level. In 61 out of the 96 cities,
top restaurants are on average located closer to the center (cBi /c
T
i > 1), but the difference is
13The “great-circle” distance is the shortest distance between two points on the spherical earth (i.e., as the crow
flies).
14Maps of other cities in the sample are available on the corresponding author’s website.
15Specifically, we use a principal coordinate transformation of the dissimilarity matrix based on great-circle
distances between restaurants to calculate the ANOVA F-statistic. We execute the more robust version of Levene’s
test and calculate deviations of group members from the group’s spatial median based on principal coordinate axes
without making any assumptions about the distribution of distances. Accordingly, we obtain the p-value by 9,999
permutations of the least-absolute-deviation residuals. The test was executed using the R package vegan 2.5-3
(Oksanen et al., 2018).
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bottom
(a) Newcastle (b) Liverpool
Figure 1: Location of top and bottom restaurants in Newcastle and Liverpool. The dashed (blue)
circle has a radius equal to the average distance of bottom restaurants from their geometric
centroid (indicated by a blue dot). The solid (red) circle has a radius equal to the average distance
of top restaurants from their geometric centroid (indicated by a red square).
significant for only 34 of them. However, out of the latter, in all but four cities, top restaurants
are located closer to the center.
Overall, based on the two tests in Figure 2, we conclude that top restaurants tend to be
spatially more concentrated than bottom ones and locate closer to the city center.
2.2.3 Spatial dependence
Our next question is whether restaurants of a certain type tend to be surrounded by restaurants
of the same or another type. To answer this, we use Ripley’s bivariate K function (see, e.g.,
Baddeley et al., 2015; Dixon, 2002), which corresponds to the expected number of type j
restaurants within a distance r of a typical type i restaurant, standardized by dividing by the
density (number per unit area) of type-j restaurants (λj):
Ki,j(r) =
1
λj
E[number of type j restaurants within a distance r
of a randomly chosen type-i restaurant].
(1)
For a city map of area A with ni type-i restaurants and nj type-j restaurants, an estimator of
the above function is
Kˆi,j(r) =
(
λˆiλˆjA
)
−1
ni∑
k=1
nj∑
l=1
I(dik,jl ≤ r)e(ik, jl), (2)
where λˆi = ni/A and λˆj = nj/A are the observed densities of type-i and type-j restaurants,
respectively; dik,jl is the distance between the k-th restaurant of type i and the l-th restaurant
of type j; I(z) is an indicator function that takes 1 if z is true and 0 otherwise; and e(ik, jl) is
8
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Figure 2: Relative dispersion (a) and relative centricity (b) between bottom and top restaurants
across 96 cities in England and Wales. Cities are ranked by total area from the smallest to the
largest.
an edge correction weight. The latter is employed to reduce the estimation bias due to the fact
that restaurants outside the city boundary are not counted even though they are within a distance
r. We therefore use the isotropic correction method, in which e(ik, jl) is the reciprocal of the
fraction of the circumference of a circle centered at the k-th restaurant of type i with radius dik,jl
that lies inside the city boundary. As the variance of the estimator increases with distance r, we
apply Ripley’s rule of thumb and take as its maximum value one quarter of the shortest side of
the rectangle enclosing the city polygon (for details, see Baddeley et al., 2015).
Under the null hypothesis of random labeling, the type of each restaurant (top or bottom)
is determined randomly, independently of other restaurants, so that KT,B(r) = KB,T (r) =
KT,T (r) = KB,B(r) = K(r). We examine departures from random labeling using three
pairwise differences between bivariateK functions: KT,T (r)−KT,B(r) andKB,B(r)−KB,T (r)
to evaluate whether restaurants tend to be surrounded by restaurants of the same or the other
type, and KT,T (r)−KB,B(r) to evaluate whether restaurants of one type cluster more or less
than those of the other type.
We make inferences based on a permutation test, fix the number of observed restaurants of
each type and their spatial locations in a city accordingly, and then randomly permute the types
(labels) of restaurants. For each of 999 randomly permuted datasets, we then evaluate three
pairwise differences between the K functions and compute their pointwise envelopes by finding
for each distance r their 25-th largest and 25-th smallest values among all simulated values
(upper and lower 2.5% quantiles). For a given distance r, the test rejects the null hypothesis of
random labeling if the empirical estimate of the relevant pairwise difference lies outside the
envelope limits at the (25 + 25)/(999 + 1) = 0.05 significance level.
All tests and simulations in this section were executed using the well-known spatstat
(Baddeley et al., 2015) package for spatial point pattern analysis, written in R. As the pertinent
K functions are based on Euclidean distances, all GPS locations of restaurants were projected
using the British National Grid projection (OSGB36).
Figure 3 shows the results for a city in our sample, Newcastle upon Tyne, which is the most
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Figure 3: Spatial dependence between restaurants in Newcastle. Solid line: empirical estimate
of pairwise differences. Dashed line: sample mean of simulations from the null hypothesis of
random labeling. Gray shading: pointwise 5% critical envelopes based on 999 simulations.
populous city in North Eastern England. In Figure 3a, the null hypothesis would be rejected at
the 5% significance level for any choice of distance r. Positive deviations of KˆT,T (r)− KˆT,B(r)
suggest that top restaurants are more likely to be found close to other top restaurants than if
the type of restaurant was randomly allocated.16 However, In Figure 3b, the deviations of
KˆB,B(r)− KˆB,T (r) are negative and below the 2.5% quantile for all distances above 0.5 km,
which suggests that bottom restaurants are more likely to be found close to a top restaurant. That
is, while top restaurants concentrate, bottom restaurants tend to disperse.17 Finally, in Figure 3c,
the deviations of KˆT,T (r)− KˆB,B(r) are positive and significant for all distances. This suggests
that top restaurants cluster more than bottom ones, which is in line with our findings in the
previous section.
Figure 4 summarizes the results for the entire sample of cities for a radius of up to 2 km.18
We observe that, for most cities with significant differences, top restaurants tend to locate closer
to other top restaurants (Figure 4a), while bottom restaurants tend to locate away from other
bottom restaurants and closer to top restaurants (Figure 4b). Also, bottom restaurants as a group
tend to be less clustered than the top ones (Figure 4c). For instance, at a distance of 1 km, the
difference KˆT,T (r)− KˆT,B is significant (and positive for all but one city) in 51 of the 96 cities.
Further, the difference KˆB,B(r) − KˆB,T is significant and negative in 36 cities. Finally, the
difference KˆT,T (r)− KˆB,B is significant and positive in 47 cities. Results for other distances
are similar.
16In Figures 3 and 4, we replace KˆT,B(r) and KˆB,T (r) with a more efficient estimator, K
∗
T,B(r) =
λˆBKˆT,B(r)+λˆT KˆB,T (r)
λˆT+λˆB
(Lotwick and Silverman, 1982).
17Note that our test is conditional on observed locations and thus valid despite the potential inhomogeneity of
λ (density of restaurants) across a city. However, as it is not conditional on spatial covariates, we are unable to
differentiate between co-location due to true dependence among restaurants and that due to exogenous features of
city territory. We can therefore discuss only unconditional or observed dependence. In our experience, analyses
based on spatial covariates are very sensitive to assumptions about the nature of interactions and the set of covariates
included; therefore, this paper does not pursue this line of research.
18Recall that, for result reliability, we impose an upper limit on the value of r for whichK is calculated, so that
for distances above 1 km, smaller cities start to fall out of the sample.
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Figure 4: Spatial dependence between restaurants in England and Wales. Gray: observed
deviation from random labeling is not significant (ns); black: observed deviation is significant
and positive (+); white: observed deviation is significant and negative (-).
Acknowledging the limitations of aggregating results for cities of different sizes, we present,
in Figure 5, the estimates of pairwise differences between pooled bivariateK functions, together
with pointwise 5% critical envelopes corresponding to the null hypothesis of random labeling.
We first use the ratio-of-sums estimator and calculate each pooled Ki,j as a weighted mean of
individual Ki,j estimates for the 96 cities with weights proportional to ninj .
19 In the next step,
we calculate the relevant pairwise difference using the pooled Ki,j estimates from the previous
step. To obtain the critical envelopes, we randomly relabel the restaurants in each city 999 times
and calculate a relevant pairwise difference between the pooledKi,j functions each time. Out
of the 999 simulated pairwise differences, we select the upper and lower 2.5% quantiles. Our
conclusion is that, on average, top restaurants in England and Wales concentrate, while bottom
restaurants disperse (except for distances below 0.1 km). Top restaurants also cluster more.
3 Theoretical Analysis
3.1 Model
The model is based on Hotelling’s paradigm of a linear city. Four firms (restaurants) sell
goods that are vertically differentiated by quality in a city that is defined as a unit interval
[0, 1]. Consumers are distributed on this interval according to the log-concave density f(y) ≥ 0,
y ∈ [0, 1], with their mass normalized to one. Each consumer buys a unit of the good provided
by the restaurants. The indirect utility of a consumer located at y and purchasing from restaurant
j = 1, ..., 4 is
uj(y) = qj − pj − (y − xj)
2 + σεj,y, (3)
19Observe that the estimator in (2) can be expressed as the ratio Kˆ(r) = Yˆ (r)/Xˆ(r), where the denominator
Xˆ(r) is the number of pairs ninj .
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Figure 5: Pooled estimates for 96 cities in England and Wales. Solid line: pooled estimate of
the pairwise difference; dashed line: sample mean of simulations from the null hypothesis of
random labeling; gray shading: pointwise 5% critical envelopes based on 999 simulations.
where qj > 0 is the quality of the good, pj > 0 is its price, xj ∈ [0, 1] is the location of restaurant
j, and εj,y is an idiosyncratic preference shock. The latter describes the fact that consumers
differ in some dimensions that the restaurants cannot observe and, therefore, they also cannot
predict with certainty the decision of any particular consumer. The scale parameter σ controls
the degree of consumer taste heterogeneity. For σ > 0, there is always a positive probability that
any consumer will buy from any restaurant. The larger σ is, the less consumers discriminate
between restaurants and the more random their buying decisions appear. The quadratic term
captures the disutility incurred by consumers due to transport costs.20
Assuming that idiosyncratic shocks are independently and identically distributed according
to a type I extreme value distribution (the logit model), the probability that a consumer located
at y buys from restaurant j is
Pj(y;p,x) =
exp {(qj − pj − (y − xj)
2)/σ}∑
4
k=1 exp {(qk − pk − (y − xk)
2)/σ}
, (4)
where p denotes the price vector (p1, p2, p3, p4) and x the vector of restaurant location
choices (x1, x2, x3, x4).
Restaurants play a two-stage game. In the first stage, they select their location, whereas,
in the second one, they select the price they charge consumers. We assume that the quality of
restaurants is given and fixed. The marginal costs of production are normalized to 0. The profit
of restaurant j, which is a continuous function of prices and location choices, is given by
Πj(p,x) = pj
∫
1
0
Pj(y;p,x)f(y) dy (5)
and is bounded below by zero.
20These costs may include the value of the time spent in travel.
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3.2 Computation of equilibria
We search for subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. To determine them, we proceed
with backward induction. We rely on a numerical algorithm consisting of two loops: the inner
one calculates the price equilibrium for any given set of firms’ locations, whereas the outer one
calculates all the location equilibria.
3.2.1 Price equilibrium
The inner loop takes a vector of given restaurant locations x¯ and calculates the price equilibrium
as a solution to the following system of four nonlinear equations (firms’ first-order conditions
for profit maximization):
∂Πj(p, x¯)
∂pj
= 0, j = 1, ..., 4. (6)
The equations above involve derivatives of integral functions that must be evaluated numerically.
We approximate these derivatives using centered finite difference schemes and compute the
integrals using MATLAB’s global adaptive quadrature method. The solution to (6) is then
obtained using the Artelys Knitro 12.0 solver.
Based on theoretical results from Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), the price equilibrium can be
shown to exist and be unique. The key argument for the existence of the equilibrium consists
of showing that a firm’s profit Πj(p,x) is quasi-concave in its own price, which is the case as
P−1j (y;p,x) can be shown to be convex in the firm’s own price. The uniqueness of the price
equilibrium follows from the log-concavity of the density of consumers f(y). Note that the
uniqueness result was previously obtained by Anderson and de Palma (1988) for the duopoly
model but the general argument of Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) extends it to the case of more
firms. The uniqueness result is particularly important to us because it ensures that all firms have
a unique best response and that no other price equilibrium exists. Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)
also show that the price equilibrium game is log-supermodular, which implies that the price
equilibrium vector is globally stable under many learning and adjustment processes. This makes
our algorithm suitable for finding the numerical solution in the inner loop.
3.2.2 Location equilibria
The outer loop solves the system of first-order necessary conditions for a location equilibrium
∂Πj(p
∗(x),x)
∂xj
= 0, j = 1, ..., 4, (7)
where p∗ is a vector of equilibrium prices for a given set of locations x. The Knitro solver
(knitromatlab lsqnonlin) starts at some initial point x0 and, using the interior-point algorithm,
attempts to find the minimum of the sum of squares of the functions that appear on the left-hand
side of equation (7), subject to the bounds 0 ≤ xj ≤ 1, ∀j = 1, ..., 4. During the search for the
solution x∗ to system (7), whenever any profit function needs to be evaluated, the outer loop
calls the inner loop to first calculate equilibrium prices for a given set of locations.
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Usually, there are many candidates for an equilibrium satisfying the first-order optimality
conditions (7). To find all of them, we restart the algorithm from 1, 000 initial locations, obtained
by randomly drawing components of x0 from the interval [0, 1]. This process gives us a set
of solutions to the firms’ first-order conditions, which are only necessary but not sufficient
conditions for an interior equilibrium. In the second step, we then eliminate candidates that fail
to satisfy second-order conditions for a local maximum. Finally, in the third step, we check that
each remaining candidate actually satisfies global optimality. For this, we check that firm j’s
location choice is a global maximum given the location of all the other firms. In other words,
for each equilibrium candidate, we look for the location xj ∈ [0, 1] of firm j that maximizes its
profit function while the locations of other firms are kept fixed to their equilibrium value. To do
this, we restart the Knitro optimizer from 100 initial points to obtain the best feasible solution
for firm j on the interval. We repeat the exercise for all j = 1, ..., 4 and keep an equilibrium
candidate only if it is a global maximum for all firms. In general, we obtain several location
equilibria.
3.2.3 Stability
When dealing with multiple location equilibria, it is useful to distinguish stable from unstable
equilibria. In the literature, the latter are usually disregarded as they are considered not to be
sustainable in practice. This is because a small perturbation around an unstable equilibrium
will grow in size rather than diminish over time. When defining local stability, we follow Dixit
(1986) and assume that, for a given location vector x, each firm adjusts its location over time at
a rate proportional to the marginal profitability of the adjustment,
dxj
dt
= sj
∂Πj(p
∗(x),x)
∂xj
, (8)
where sj > 0 is the adjustment speed of restaurant j, j = 1, ..., 4. By performing a linear approx-
imation around the equilibrium x∗, a system of perturbation equations is obtained. Following
the stability conditions in Dixit (1986), we require that all eigenvalues of the corresponding
4× 4 matrix Jij = ∂
2Πi(p
∗,x∗)/∂xi∂xj for i, j = 1, ..., 4, have negative real parts.
3.3 Simulation results
In our baseline specification, we consider a uniform density of consumers (f(y) = 1 for
y ∈ [0, 1], and 0 otherwise) and assume that firms provide goods of the same quality (qj =
1, ∀j = 1, ..., 4). For a relatively high level of consumer taste heterogeneity (i.e., σ = 1), we
observe that, in equilibrium, all firms locate in the center (see Figure 6a). Lower values of
taste heterogeneity σ induce multiple equilibria21; however, only a single equilibrium satisfies
the stability condition. For σ = 0.1, we find 51 equilibria, most of which differ only in the
permutation of firm names. Among them, we identify 5 distinct types of equilibria, shown in
Figure 6b, of which only the last one—type 5, with two firms in the center and the other two
21This observation is similar to a result in de Palma et al. (1987), who consider symmetric equilibria in a 3-firm
logit model.
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around it—is stable.22
When consumer taste heterogeneity σ decreases, the consumer’s choice of a restaurant is
guided more by the restaurants’ objective characteristics and less by his or her idiosyncratic taste.
This increases the competition among the restaurants. For σ = 0.08, the central agglomeration
equilibrium (type 1) disappears and types 2–5 remain. In turn, for σ = 0.06, the equilibrium
with 3 firms at the same place (type 2) also disappears and only types 3–5 remain. Then, for
σ = 0.05, the equilibria with two firms at the same place but outside the center (types 3 and
4) disappear, so only equilibrium type 5 remains. At the same time, a new type of symmetric
equilibrium (type 6) appears, where firms non-uniformly spread out throughout the city. Of
types 5 and 6, only equilibrium type 6 is stable (see Figure 6c). This stable equilibrium, with
firms spread out throughout the city, remains the only equilibrium when sigma approaches zero
(i.e., σ = 0.01 in Figure 6d).23 As in de Palma et al. (1987), a lower level of consumer taste
heterogeneity encourages the spatial dispersion of restaurants.
3.3.1 Equilibria with quality differentiation
To explore the effects of quality differentiation on the location of the restaurants, we consider
a model where 2 of the restaurants provide a high-quality good and the other 2 provide a
low-quality good. For convenience, we term the high-quality (top) restaurants firms 1 and 2, and
the low-quality (bottom) restaurants firms 3 and 4.
Solving the model over a wide range of parameter values, we observe that when the value of
consumer taste heterogeneity σ is high, a sufficiently large quality difference between top and
bottom firms is needed to relocate some firms away from the center. Moreover, intermediate
values of the consumer taste heterogeneity σ are needed to obtain (stable) equilibria in which
top firms are more spatially concentrated than bottom ones.
When the value of consumer taste heterogeneity is high (for instance, σ = 0.2) and the quality
difference is small—e.g., (q1, q2, q3, q4) = (1.1, 1.1, 1, 1), which we shorten to (q
T , qB) =
(1.1, 1)—in equilibrium, all firms locate in the center. For a larger quality difference, we obtain a
different equilibrium in which bottom firms locate in the center, whereas top firms locate around
them—for (qT , qB) = (2, 1), the equilibrium locations are (0.214, 0.786, 0.5, 0.5), with prices
(0.584, 0.584, 0.205, 0.205) and profits (0.2776, 0.2776, 0.0051, 0.0051), respectively. For an
even larger quality difference, the top firms move even farther away from the center (and from
each other).
For intermediate values of the consumer taste heterogeneity σ, we are able to find top firms
relatively closer to the center, as long as the quality difference between top and bottom firms is
not too large. For instance, consider σ = 0.1 with a small quality difference, namely, (qT , qB) =
(1.1, 1). There are now four types of equilibria (compared to Figure 6b): i) top firms together at
one place and bottom firms together at another place, (0.546, 0.546, 0.312, 0.312); ii) top firms
in the center, (0.5, 0.5, 0.256, 0.744), iii) bottom firms in the center, (0.370, 0.630, 0.5, 0.5);
22Equilibrium types 2 and 3 in Figure 6b also have their mirror counterparts 1− x. Throughout the text, we
classify any such mirror equilibria as one single type.
23It is interesting to observe that equilibrium locations (0.124, 0.396, 0.604, 0.876), which we obtain for
σ = 0.01, are identical, to three decimal places, to those in Brenner (2005), who considers a n-firm Hotelling model
with homogenous consumers.
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Figure 6: Location equilibria for different levels of consumer taste heterogeneity (σ), when firms
provide goods of the same quality (q1 = q2 = q3 = q4 = 1).
and, iv) all firms spread out, with top firms closer to the center, (0.406, 0.594, 0.301, 0.699).
However, only the last equilibrium is stable. Note that, for a larger quality difference, namely,
(qT , qB) = (1.2, 1), the first equilibrium above disappears. There are three types of equilibria
left, of which only the last one is stable: (0.5, 0.5, 0.208, 0.792), (0.369, 0.631, 0.5, 0.5), and
(0.37, 0.63, 0.317, 0.683). For an even larger quality difference, namely, (qT , qB) = (1.3, 1),
the equilibrium with the top firms in the center disappears and the following two equilibria
remain: the unstable one with the bottom firms in the center (0.347, 0.653, 0.5, 0.5) and the
stable one with all the firms spread out (0.346, 0.654, 0.386, 0.614). Finally, for a very large
quality difference, namely, (qT , qB) = (1.4, 1), the only equilibrium left, which is stable, shows
that bottom firms locate in the center, (0.320, 0.680, 0.5, 0.5).
Top restaurants’ higher (relative) quality increases their market power but also the com-
petition among them. This drives top restaurants to locate farther from one another. This is
especially visible when we compare the stable equilibria at different levels of quality differences
in Figure 7. When the quality difference is small, (qT , qB) = (1.1, 1), the top firms locate close
to the center as well as to each other, whereas the bottom firms locate around them (Figure 7a).
As the relative quality of the top firms increases (Figure 7b–7c), the top firms start moving apart,
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whereas the bottom ones are increasingly attracted to the center. When the quality difference is
large, namely, (qT , qB) = (1.4, 1), in Figure 7d, the initial situation is completely reversed—it
is now the top firms that locate around the bottom firms, both of which are in the center. In all
these equilibria, the top firms charge higher prices and realize larger profits than the bottom
firms (compare pT and ΠT with pB and ΠB, respectively, in Figure 7).
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(a) (qT , qB) = (1.1, 1)
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(b) (qT , qB) = (1.2, 1)
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(c) (qT , qB) = (1.3, 1)
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(d) (qT , qB) = (1.4, 1)
Figure 7: Stable equilibria for different levels of quality difference between top (red) and bottom
(blue) restaurants; σ = 0.1.
We can interpret the results of stable equilibria for different levels of consumer taste het-
erogeneity as follows. When consumer taste heterogeneity is relatively high, buying decisions
appear rather random to restaurants. Consequently, the city center offers relatively little advan-
tage in terms of access to the customer base. As competition is fiercer between top restaurants
than bottom ones, top restaurants disperse more. However, when consumer taste heterogeneity
is relatively low, transport costs play a prominent role in buying decisions. The city center
attracts top restaurants, as it provides them the best access to the customer base. Top restaurants
are able to drive away bottom restaurants in the center through quality competition. The latter
then disperse around top restaurants, primarily serving customers living outside the city center.
When the quality difference between restaurant groups increases, it results in fiercer competition
between top restaurants, which forces them to move apart.
The analysis above assumes a uniform distribution of consumers. In reality, city centers
attract businesses due to the high concentration of consumers and, therefore, the high demand
available at these locations. Higher consumer densities in city centers are the rule rather than the
exception.24 Therefore, in the next section, we introduce a non-uniform density of consumers.
3.3.2 Equilibria with a non-uniform density of consumers
We assume that the density of consumers f(y), y ∈ [0, 1], is given by a normal distribution
truncated over the city interval [0, 1]. For its mean, we take the city center (µ = 0.5). We
then vary the standard deviation of the parent normal distribution (ω) to see how the degree of
consumer concentration in the city center affects the (relative) location of restaurants.
When the values of the other parameters are kept fixed, a relatively larger mass of consumers
in the center (lower ω) calls for a larger quality difference to create equilibria in which any
24Our data confirm this for population densities. See footnote 25.
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of the firms locate away from the city center. It also induces firms in any non-agglomeration
equilibrium to locate closer to the center than they would if ω was higher. These results were
expected. More interesting is the observation that the magnitude of the quality difference
between the top and bottom restaurants plays a crucial role in how consumer density influences
their relative locations.
In Figure 8, we illustrate this for σ = 0.1. We focus on stable equilibria. In the first column,
the quality difference is small, (qT , qB) = (1.1, 1). When the relative mass of consumers in the
center increases (ω falls), the top firms move closer to the center. Although this leads to a lower
price due to the increased competition, the market size effect dominates. Although bottom firms
are also attracted to the center, they remain separated and farther from the center than the top
ones, except in the case of a very densely populated center (ω = 0.2), where all the firms locate
in the center.
The situation is very different when the quality difference is larger. In the second column of
Figure 8, (qT , qB) = (1.2, 1). A lower value of ω attracts both types of restaurants to the center
(compared to the case of the uniform distribution of consumers in the first row of Figure 7)
but the effect is stronger for bottom restaurants. When ω = 0.4, the latter are already closer
to the center than top restaurants. When the quality difference is large, the bottom restaurants
are inferior rivals and competition exists mostly between the top restaurants. This increased
competition between the top restaurants makes them relatively less willing to locate close to
each other. Specifically, the closer top restaurants are to each other, the more consumers’ choices
are guided by prices, which drives both prices and profits down.
4 Regression Analysis
The analysis of our theoretical model in the previous section allows us to develop empirically
testable behavioral predictions as indicated below.
Behavioral Predictions:
1. An increase in the population density in the city center reduces the spatial dispersion of
both top and bottom restaurants.
2. When the quality difference between top and bottom restaurants increases,
(a) the absolute spatial dispersion among top restaurants increases,
(b) the relative spatial dispersion between top and bottom restaurants increases, and
(c) the absolute spatial dispersion of bottom restaurants decreases.
To test these predictions, we construct a dataset by combining the city-level spatial statistics
reported in Section 2 with the data on different city characteristics obtained from the Office for
National Statistics. Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the key variables.
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Figure 8: Stable equilibria for varying values of consumer dispersion (ω). The quality difference
is small in the first column and large in the second one. In all the plots, σ = 0.1
4.1 Description of variables
Geographical dispersion of restaurants. Measures of restaurants’ geographical dispersion
are our dependent variables. Here, we use TdistC and BdistC, which are the average distances
of “top” and ‘bottom” restaurants, respectively, from the city center (see Section 2.2.2). Based on
Box-Cox tests, we take the logarithmic transformation of these variables to form lnTdistC and
lnBdistC, respectively. To test Behavioral Prediction 2(b) concerning the relative dispersion of
the restaurants, we use lnTBdistC = lnTdistC − lnBdistC.
Population dispersion. The variable PD corresponds to the population density in the city
center relative to that in the surrounding area. Specifically, we measure this non-parametrically
using PDX1−X2 = den(X1)− den(X2), for X1 < X2, where den(X) is the population density
within an X-kilometer radius of the city center, expressed as thousands of people per km2. To
obtain an estimate of the total population living within the circle of the X-kilometer radius, we
count the number of people living within the OAs whose centroids lie inside the circle. We
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report the results for PD2−4 = den(2)− den(4).
25, 26
Restaurant quality dispersion. We use the overall rating of each restaurant to construct
quality dispersion measures that are comparable across different cities.27 We compute two
alternative measures. The first one is σQ, which is the standard deviation of the overall rating
for all the restaurants in the city. Our theory in Section 3 relies on two types of restaurants.
However, in reality, when deciding where to locate, a new restaurant would take into account the
location of all types of restaurants. As a robustness check, we also use dQ, which is defined as
the difference between the average overall rating of the top and bottom quartiles of restaurants
in the city. This measure is more closely related to our theoretical model, but potentially ignores
the effect of restaurants of intermediate quality.
Control variables. Our theoretical model is based on a city whose geographical size is
normalized. Since two of our dependent variables, TdistC and BdistC, represent physical
distances in kilometers, it is possible that these measures reflect, to some extent, the effect of the
geographical size of cities. Similarly, it is possible that the average distance of restaurants is
influenced by tourist activities and the total number of restaurants. To address such concerns, in
a robustness check, we use the logarithm of city area (lnArea), the logarithm of the number
of restaurants (lnNR), and the dummy variable Tourist as our control variables. The variable
Tourist takes the value 1 if, between 1999 and 2018, the city was mentioned at least once on
the list of 20 most visited towns and cities by overseas visitors according to the “inbound town
data” released by the Office for National Statistics. Otherwise, it takes the value 0.
4.2 Empirical Results
To empirically test our behavioral predictions, we run cross-sectional regressions of the restau-
rants’ geographical dispersion measures on the dispersion of the population and restaurant
quality. Table 3 reports the results based on ordinary least squares.
The estimated coefficients for PD2−4 in columns (1)–(4) and (9)–(12) are all negative and
significant. This is in line with Prediction 1—the geographical dispersion of both types of
restaurants is smaller when the population density in the city center is relatively larger. Note that
our theoretical model does not give clear predictions about the relative geographical dispersion
of top and bottom restaurants. In columns (5)–(8), the coefficients for PD2−4 are also negative,
although not always significant. Hence, the effect of the population density in the city center
appears stronger for top restaurants than for bottom ones.
25 We observe that PD2−4 is positive for 90 out of 96 cities in our sample.
26For robustness, we also tried alternative sets of distances, such as PD1−3 = den(1)− den(3). The results
are qualitatively similar and available upon request.
27Overall rating is a raw score based on reviewers’ overall assessment of the restaurant, which ranges from 1
(terrible) to 5 (excellent). As such, it captures the cardinal dimension of restaurant quality, whereas TripAdvisor’s
popularity ranking is an ordinal measure that takes into account overall ratings as well as other information, such as
the recency and number of reviews. TripAdvisor recommends the use of the popularity ranking for its recency and
consistency of information instead of, for example, the overall rating. However, the dispersion of ordinal measures,
such as popularity rankings, is not informative.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for variables used in the empirical analysis (N = 96)
mean sd min max Remarks
TdistC 1.760 0.845 0.348 4.347 Average distance of top restaurants from the city center (in km)
BdistC 1.890 0.798 0.620 4.970 Average distance of bottom restaurants from the city center (in km)
PD2−4 1.315 0.924 -0.789 5.152
Dispersion of population density in the city (Population density within a two-km radius
of the city center minus population density within a four-km radius)
σQ 0.770 0.083 0.601 1.032 Standard deviation of TripAdvisor’s “overall rating” for all restaurants in the city
dQ 1.346 0.200 0.861 2.053 Difference in TripAdvisor’s average “overall rating” between the top and bottom groups
Area 207.911 340.746 10.635 2224.189 Area of the city (in km2)
NR 330.365 280.912 74.000 1498.000 The number of restaurants in the city (according to TripAdvisor)
Tourist 0.219 0.416 0 1
The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the city appears at least once on the list of 20
most visited cities between 1999 and 2018, and 0 otherwise.
2
1
In columns (1)–(4), σQ and dQ are all positive and significant. This finding supports
Prediction 2(a) about the effect of quality difference on the absolute dispersion of top restaurants.
A larger quality difference between top and bottom restaurants increases the distance between
top restaurants.
The positive and significant coefficients for σQ and dQ in columns (5)–(8) present some
evidence supporting Prediction 2(b) concerning the effect of quality difference on the relative
dispersion of the two groups of restaurants. However, Prediction 2(c) about bottom restaurants
is not adequately supported by our data. The only negative point estimate is nonsignificant,
whereas others are positive and all, except one, are nonsignificant. Here, it emerges that our
stylized logit Hotelling model does not work well.
The effects of the control variables can be found in the even-numbered columns. As
anticipated, the geographical dispersion of both restaurant types is larger in cities with larger
areas and more restaurants. A city’s being an important tourist destination reduces the dispersion
of both restaurant types in it. This is in line with the fact that city centers usually exhibit the
highest concentration of visitor-related facilities and services. Importantly, the inclusion of
various control variables does not qualitatively affect our key findings.
To provide a further robustness check, we also redo our analysis using spatial regression
methods. In the first set of analyses, we model spatial dependence through the error terms
and estimate the models using the generalized spatial two-stage least squares. Following the
spatial regression literature, we assume that spatial effects decay with distance and use the
inverse distance weighting matrix, where the distance between cities is measured as the distance
between their city centers.28 The results are reported in Table 4, which shows that our key results
are unaffected. Using the same weighting matrix, we also perform a spatial regression analysis
based on a model that allows for spatial dependence through both the dependent variable and the
error terms.29 We present the estimates in Table 5. Again, we find our results remain unchanged
under this alternative estimation strategy.
5 Concluding remarks
This study explores the location of restaurants, grouped into top- and bottom-rated restaurants
based on TripAdvisor’s ratings, across large cities in England and Wales. Using a unique
dataset, we find that in many cities in the sample, there exist significant differences in the
way top-ranked and bottom-ranked restaurants locate. Top restaurants tend to be less spatially
dispersed throughout the city and locate relatively closer to the city center than bottom ones. We
28The estimated model is y =
∑K
k=1 βkxk + u, u = ρWu + ǫ, where y is a vector of observations of the
dependent variable, xk a vector of observations of the k-th covariate and βk is the corresponding regression
parameter. The errors u are spatially autoregressive. W is a spatial weighting matrix, ρ is the spatial autoregressive
coefficient, and ǫ is a vector of innovations that are assumed to be independent but heteroskedastically distributed,
with heteroskedasticity being of unknown form. This model addresses the possibility that unobserved variables
affect nearby cities.
29The estimated model is y =
∑K
k=1 βkxk + λWy + u, u = ρWu+ ǫ, where λ is the spatial autocorrelation
parameter corresponding to the spatial lag of the dependent variableWy (denoted by “Spatial DV” in Table 5). In
addition to the autocorrelation in the error term, the current model also allows for outcomes of nearby cities to be
interdependent.
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Table 3: Regression analysis of the spatial dispersion of restaurants (OLS)
lnTdistC lnTBdistC lnBdistC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PD2−4 -0.180
∗∗ -0.168∗∗ -0.191∗∗ -0.178∗∗ -0.068∗ -0.021 -0.077∗ -0.028 -0.112∗∗ -0.148∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.150∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
σQ 1.823
∗∗ 1.661∗∗ 1.216∗∗ 1.018∗∗ 0.606 0.642+
(0.66) (0.48) (0.40) (0.32) (0.52) (0.37)
dQ 0.446+ 0.441∗ 0.457∗∗ 0.354∗∗ -0.012 0.087
(0.24) (0.19) (0.17) (0.13) (0.19) (0.14)
lnArea 0.218∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.083+ 0.086+ 0.135∗∗ 0.135∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
lnNR 0.320
∗∗ 0.328∗∗ -0.102+ -0.098 0.422∗∗ 0.427∗∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Tourist -0.421∗ -0.434∗ -0.233∗ -0.232∗ -0.188+ -0.202+
(0.18) (0.19) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
const. -0.731 -3.339∗∗ 0.087 -2.699∗∗ -0.967∗∗ -0.651+ -0.635∗ -0.370 0.236 -2.688∗∗ 0.722∗∗ -2.329∗∗
(0.51) (0.61) (0.31) (0.55) (0.32) (0.37) (0.24) (0.32) (0.40) (0.40) (0.26) (0.36)
# obs. 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Adj. R2 0.161 0.466 0.110 0.426 0.097 0.295 0.083 0.276 0.065 0.563 0.049 0.547
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Regression analysis of the spatial dispersion of restaurants (Spatial model I)
lnTdistC lnTBdistC lnBdistC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PD2−4 -0.185
∗∗ -0.176∗∗ -0.184∗∗ -0.182∗∗ -0.068∗ -0.020 -0.075∗ -0.024 -0.107∗∗ -0.144∗∗ -0.105∗∗ -0.148∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
σQ 1.962
∗∗ 1.724∗∗ 1.246∗∗ 1.012∗∗ 0.556 0.707+
(0.64) (0.44) (0.39) (0.31) (0.52) (0.38)
dQ 0.398+ 0.456∗ 0.429∗ 0.324∗ -0.038 0.097
(0.24) (0.19) (0.17) (0.13) (0.19) (0.14)
lnArea 0.213∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.083+ 0.086+ 0.138∗∗ 0.136∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
lnNR 0.313
∗∗ 0.328∗∗ -0.102+ -0.096+ 0.421∗∗ 0.425∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Tourist -0.423∗ -0.437∗ -0.234∗ -0.232∗ -0.186∗ -0.199+
(0.17) (0.18) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
const. -0.829+ -3.301∗∗ 0.134 -2.704∗∗ -0.989∗∗ -0.649+ -0.605∗ -0.360 0.270 -2.766∗∗ 0.744∗∗ -2.348∗∗
(0.49) (0.54) (0.31) (0.52) (0.31) (0.36) (0.24) (0.32) (0.40) (0.41) (0.27) (0.36)
Spatial Error -0.309 -0.526 0.248 -0.217 0.723 0.174 0.816 0.421 0.501 0.887+ 0.610 0.819
(0.57) (0.71) (0.41) (0.62) (1.05) (0.58) (0.87) (0.47) (0.55) (0.46) (0.50) (0.52)
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Pseudo R2 0.179 0.493 0.129 0.456 0.116 0.332 0.102 0.314 0.084 0.586 0.069 0.570
Notes: Spatial heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Regression analysis of the spatial dispersion of restaurants (Spatial model II)
lnTdistC lnTBdistC lnBdistC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PD2−4 -0.153
∗∗ -0.145∗∗ -0.144∗∗ -0.138∗∗ -0.070∗ -0.029 -0.081∗∗ -0.035 -0.102∗ -0.127∗∗ -0.092∗ -0.124∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
σQ 1.770
∗∗ 1.323∗∗ 1.127∗ 0.790∗ 0.524 0.572
(0.66) (0.49) (0.45) (0.35) (0.54) (0.40)
dQ 0.383 0.317+ 0.413∗ 0.258+ -0.054 0.055
(0.24) (0.18) (0.19) (0.14) (0.20) (0.15)
lnArea 0.204∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.067 0.069 0.139∗∗ 0.137∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
lnNR 0.303
∗∗ 0.313∗∗ -0.138∗ -0.133∗ 0.431∗∗ 0.435∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Tourist -0.434∗ -0.457∗ -0.214∗ -0.215+ -0.199∗ -0.215∗
(0.17) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
const. -0.923∗ -3.084∗∗ -0.185 -2.624∗∗ -0.795∗ -0.065 -0.441 0.184 0.252 -2.891∗∗ 0.632∗ -2.572∗∗
(0.46) (0.52) (0.30) (0.45) (0.40) (0.44) (0.29) (0.36) (0.40) (0.40) (0.29) (0.36)
Spatial DV 0.444∗ 0.334∗ 0.673∗∗ 0.492∗∗ 1.064+ 1.336∗ 1.335∗ 1.530∗∗ 0.074 0.318 0.239 0.377∗
(0.21) (0.16) (0.21) (0.14) (0.62) (0.53) (0.59) (0.50) (0.31) (0.19) (0.30) (0.17)
Spatial Error -0.802 -0.907 -0.564 -1.044 0.080 -0.872 -0.037 -0.917 0.464 0.656 0.464 0.519
(0.60) (0.78) (0.62) (0.86) (1.24) (0.86) (1.23) (0.88) (0.59) (0.42) (0.57) (0.45)
# obs. 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.506 0.151 0.483 0.126 0.327 0.109 0.312 0.084 0.581 0.065 0.574
Notes: Spatial heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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also explore the spatial dependence between restaurant types and find that in the majority of
cities, top restaurants locate closer to their own type and are, as a group, more clustered than
bottom restaurants. For bottom restaurants, such patterns are comparably less frequent but when
prominent, they involve bottom restaurants usually locating away from their own type and closer
to top restaurants.
To explore location incentives theoretically, we extend the standard logit Hotelling model
to 4 firms and introduce both vertical differentiation of goods and a non-uniform density of
consumers. We develop a numerical algorithm to find both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria
and distinguish stable from unstable ones. Our theoretical model is able to produce stable
equilibria in which top restaurants are concentrated, whereas bottom ones are dispersed. We
find a relatively higher concentration of top restaurants when consumer taste heterogeneity is
sufficiently low and the quality difference between both restaurant groups is not “too large.”
A larger quality difference, ceteris paribus, increases competition between top restaurants and
induces them to move apart, whereas bottom restaurants are increasingly attracted to the void
left in the center.
Our regression analysis shows that cities with a relatively larger population density in the
center and those that are important tourist destinations experience a higher concentration of
restaurants in the center. A large quality difference leads to the dispersion of top restaurants, as
predicted by the model. However, the data do not confirm our prediction that a larger quality
difference would pull bottom restaurants toward the center. The stylized logit model does not
perform well in this case. This means that, in practice, some additional factors are likely to
affect location decisions. We see this as an interesting direction for future research.
Several other possible directions for future research emerge following our analysis. In
practice, restaurants are also differentiated by the type of food they offer (Italian, vegan, etc.).
A more complex model could explore how this horizontal differentiation interacts with quality
differentiation for location decisions, both in theory and practice. Another interesting direction
would be the inclusion of the time dimension, especially the entry and exit times of different
restaurant types and the evolution of their location over time. Richer data might also enable
one to perform a firm-level analysis and control for spatial covariates, such as the location
of shopping centers and tourist attractions, to make conclusions about the conditional spatial
dependence between restaurants. The generalization of our results to cities in other countries
and a comparison with results for quality-differentiated firms in other industries (e.g., hotels and
hairdressing salons) are also yet to be explored.
Appendices
A List of Cities
List of 96 cities in the sample, ordered alphabetically:
Basildon, Basingstoke, Bath, Bedford, Birkenhead, Birmingham, Blackburn, Blackpool,
Bolton, Bournemouth, Bradford, Brighton, Bristol, Burnley, Cambridge, Canterbury, Cardiff,
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Carlisle, Chelmsford, Cheltenham, Chester, Chesterfield, Chichester, Colchester, Coventry,
Crawley, Croydon, Darlington, Derby, Doncaster, Dudley, Durham, Eastbourne, Enfield, Ex-
eter, Gloucester, Hereford, Lancaster, Leamington Spa, Leeds, Leicester, Lichfield, Lincoln,
Liverpool, Luton, Maidstone, Manchester, Mansfield, Middlesbrough, Milton Keynes, New-
castle upon Tyne, Newport, Northampton, Norwich, Nottingham, Nuneaton, Oldham, Oxford,
Peterborough, Plymouth, Poole, Portsmouth, Preston, Reading, Rochdale, Rotherham, Salford,
Salisbury, Sheffield, Solihull, Southampton, Southend on Sea, Southport, St Albans, Stevenage,
St Helens, Stockport, Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland, Sutton, Sutton Coldfield, Swansea, Swin-
don, Telford, Wakefield, Warrington, Watford, Wembley, West Bromwich, Wigan, Winchester,
Woking, Wolverhampton, Worcester, Worthing, York.
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